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Abstract
The ECB has decided to implement large-scale quantitative easing (QE) measures
since March 2015 until September 2016. This unconventional monetary policy has
had a variety of precedents, in the Japanese, UK and US economies. These
experiments have been effective at modifying government and corporate bond
yields, mostly in the UK and US and to a lesser extent in Japan. This conclusion is
not context-free. The European QE has started in a deflation era which requires
more activism and cooperation from the ECB and Euro area governments than in
the UK and the US when their central banks embarked in QE. The success of the
European QE will also depend substantially on the depreciation of the Euro and
will require clear communication by the ECB that it is prepared to accept a large
depreciation at least until the inflation rate goes back to its target.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 The ECB has decided to implement large-scale quantitative easing measures. The
operations have started in March 2015 and should be conducted until September
2016 and in any case until the path of inflation is consistent with the target of the
ECB, which is to achieve an inflation rate below but close to 2%. This unconventional
monetary policy has had a variety of precedents, in the Japanese, UK and US
economies. These experiments have been effective at modifying government and
corporate bond yields, mostly in the UK and US and to a lesser extent in Japan. Their
macro effects, either on GDP or on inflation, have generally been low or temporary. A
few papers acknowledge the incidence of US QE on the US dollar exchange rate.
 Empirical assessments of former unconventional measures taken by the ECB are
globally below expectations. First, Euro area banks already have very broad and very
advantageous access to ECB liquidity through its monetary policy operations.
Second, the weakness of credit in the Euro area is not simply the result of supply
factors but also of demand factors. Sluggish activity and private agents’ efforts to
shed debt are holding back lending. The main objective behind the ECB QE shall be
to drive up inflation expectations and fight deflation.
 According to the literature and own view, a few key messages from foreign QE
experiments are worth mentioning.
 The first message is that QE’s main channel has been the portfolio-balance one.
However, this effect may not prove very strong in the Euro area. First, some
countries, like Germany, already have historically low interest rates. Second, the
requirement by commercial banks to maintain their capital ratios may also produce
lower interest rates, not in Euro area countries, but outside of the Euro area, e.g. in
the US and the UK where demand for bonds may increase after European banks may
have sold parts of their European government bonds holdings to the ECB.
Consequently, interest rates would not necessarily decrease in the Euro area, as
would be expected, but the Euro would depreciate.
 Hence, the second key message is that the exchange rate channel will be crucial in
the European context. Consequently, it may be recommended that the ECB does not
prevent the Euro depreciation, though it may lead to higher exchange rate volatility.
It certainly requires communication by the ECB on the persistence of a low main
refinancing operations (MRO) interest rate (“forward guidance”), acknowledging the
reliance of QE on the exchange rate channel.
 The third key message relates to the context in which QE measures have been
implemented. In the US and UK, QE measures started when inflation, not deflation,
was present in the economy. Under deflation like in Japan, the potential growing size
of real debts burdens the policy mix as it fosters the government to resume fiscal
consolidation. In the European context, it is certainly crucial that QE does not see its
potential effects limited by a new wave of austerity because prices, currently going
down, weigh on real debts.
 The success of ECB QE at driving up inflation and inflation expectations requires
government interventions. An actual flexibility in the management of public deficits,
with margins for maneuver to limit fiscal consolidation or to implement a fiscal
expansion in some countries, may help the ECB to fulfil its mandate. To this end, the
ECB might reinforce the effects of investment plans in the Euro area and notably the
Juncker’s Plan by making securities issued to finance investments (public or private)
eligible to the assets purchase programme.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The gloomy economic situation in the Euro area with its deflationary risks (see iAGS 2015)
brought the European Central Bank (ECB) to undertake a round of quantitative easing (QE).
These measures, some of which may demand that the ECB take on risk – via the purchase
of securities, e.g. Asset Backed Securities (ABS) – are controversial.
On the one hand, ECB QE is criticized on the grounds that the ECB is exceeding its mandate
for price stability by subjecting the European economies to a risk of inflation stemming
from the excess of liquidity put in circulation. In our view though, with an euro area
inflation rate at 0.4% in 2014 and inflation forecasts at -0.1% and 1.3% for 2015 and 2016
respectively (EC, European Economic Forecast, Winter 2015), the risk of inflation is rather
limited in the short and medium run. Such a debate on the risk of inflation had also been
raised in the United States, notably by Charles Plosser, the President of the Federal
Reserve of Philadelphia, but these views were not shared by other FOMC members and
were at odds with economic and monetary developments.
On the other hand, ECB QE is advocated on the grounds that the ECB is providing the right
response to help Europe’s weak economic situation, while respecting the price stability
mandate in the context of the current institutional framework. The inflation rate has indeed
been far from the 2% target for a long period now. According to latest ECB staff
macroeconomic projections, inflation is expected to remain under the ECB target in both
2015 and 2016. As stated by Ubide (2014) “by accepting a long period of low inflation, the
ECB is either revealing a new, deflationary bias or not fulfilling its price stability mandate”.
The debate should then not focus on whether or not QE is justified but whether it will help
the ECB to comply with its inflation mandate. It may be argued that this response has been
too slow, that it is partly inadequate and that it should urge an institutional change. But the
ECB response shows that the famous words pronounced by Mario Draghi in July 2012
(“whatever it takes”) are matched by deeds.
The most relevant objective of monetary policy today is to fight deflation and avoid that the
Euro area economy enters a Japanese-style long-term crisis. Will ECB QE help the Euro
area to escape the Japanese trap?
After having reviewed the recent unconventional measures implemented by the ECB, in
comparison with similar measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England
and the Bank of Japan, we discuss the effectiveness of these measures, drawing on the
empirical literature. We conclude with some policy recommendations drawn from different
QE experiences and by highlighting key challenges ahead for ECB monetary policy.
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2. THE MECHANICS OF QE
The literature has emphasized several channels through which QE may have an impact on
the economy, but first, it might be useful to broadly define the mechanics of this
unconventional monetary policy measure. QE is a monetary policy decision, which entails
an expansion of central bank’s balance sheet mainly through the purchase of financial
assets (Treasury bonds or other securities) or through lending to the financial system. It is
sometimes opposed to credit easing whereby the aim is to modify the composition of the
assets of central bank. However, the expansion of central bank’s balance sheet may also be
accompanied by a change in the composition of its portfolio blurring the distinction between
QE and credit easing. It should be noted that not all increases in the central banks’ balance
sheet may be qualified as QE even though they would be unconventional.
The potential effects of QE are well summarized by Joyce et al. (2011) or Krishnamurthy et
al. (2014). They point out to several channels through which QE asset purchases could
potentially affect economic activity:
1. Policy signalling effect: an announcement of large-scale asset purchases may be
perceived as a signal of a more accommodative monetary policy and send the signal that
monetary policy rate will remain low for a long period, at least until the end of the asset
purchase program. This policy of “forward guidance” can also consist of announcing that
the central bank benchmark rate will not be cut before an announced date or until the
unemployment rate falls below a certain threshold (e.g. 7% of the working population as
did the Bank of England since summer 2013) or announcing an unlimited conditional
buyback of sovereign debt  to limit the upward pressure on government bond yields (as
was the case for ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme, launched in the
summer of 2012, and yet to be used). Considering that long-term interest rates reflect
expectations of future short-term interest rates, announcing large-scale purchases of
government bonds should trigger a decline in long term rates, through the expectations
channel.
2. Portfolio balance effect: if the central bank buys assets, portfolio arbitrage generates an
increase in the prices of the assets concerned as well assets which are close substitutes,
lower yields and, thus, borrowing costs. At the same time, higher asset prices increase the
wealth of economic agents and thus their ability to generate more spending.
3. A liquidity effect: in creating money and buying assets, the central bank can quickly
inject liquidity into the financial system.
4. A confidence effect: if economic agents think that the QE is a useful policy that can
improve economic perspectives, its sole announcement can boost consumers and firms’
confidence. They can consequently increase their spending. A confidence effect may also
generate an increase in asset prices and decrease risk premia. If agents consider that
monetary policy is powerful, they expect those measures to be successful in increasing
inflation: rising inflation expectations translate into declining real interest rates. This
channel was notably emphasized by Eggertson and Woodford (2003).
5. A bank lending channel: if QE’s modalities allow the central bank to buy assets from
non-banks (directly or indirectly), the bank-lending channel improves. Indeed, the banking
sector will observe a rise of its reserves at the central bank, matched by a corresponding
rise of deposits. Meanwhile, if non-banks’ assets become more liquid, it could encourage
the banks to grant more (new) loans than they would have done in the absence of QE.
6. A default channel: especially in the Euro area case, if QE positively affects both the long-
term bond yields and macroeconomic perspectives, risk premia may decrease and thus
lower even more the long-term bond yield. This will decrease the risk of sovereign default
The QE experience: worth a try?
PE 542.188 7
and give leeway for a more accommodative fiscal policy as investors realise that there is a
buyer-of-last-resort. In the Euro area, this would help to mitigate the risk of a liquidity
squeeze or sudden stops, stemming from the fact that in the monetary union “governments
issue debt in a currency over which they have no control” (as explained by De Grauwe,
2012).
7. An exchange rate channel: money creation also weakens the exchange rate, favouring
net exports. This channel may be viewed as a consequence of the portfolio channel if
rebalancing involves the purchase of foreign assets by the seller of the asset bought by the
central bank. The seller is indeed searching for yield and may find more profitable to hold
foreign assets, hence triggering a depreciation of the domestic currency.
It may be stressed that these transmission channels are not necessarily different from the
transmission channels of “conventional” monetary policy measures. They are also
complementary. The issue of which of this channel is the most important for QE remains an
empirical issue.
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3. QE AT THE FED, THE BANK OF ENGLAND AND THE BANK
OF JAPAN
The major central banks have resorted to various conventional and unconventional
monetary policy measures that have increased and/or changed the size and composition of
their balance sheets. Despite a wide array of measures, the effects of unconventional policy
measures remain disputable.
3.1. Policy measures
Several types of interventions have been endorsed:
The Fed and the Bank of England decided to intervene, as a first step, mainly through –
conventional – loans to banks facing liquidity problems. In a second step, these central
banks engaged in purchases of securities on the markets to lower long-term interest rates
and stimulate the economy. For example, the Federal Reserve established programmes to
purchase US government debt (the first was launched in March 2009 and has been named
QE-I; it was then followed by QE-II and QE-III) and mortgage-backed securities. In June
2014, the securities portfolio of the Federal Reserve was worth 4000 billion dollars, or
about 90% of its balance sheet (Figure 1). Likewise, in January 2009 the Bank of England
set up the Asset Purchase Facility, a very large-scale programme to purchase British
government securities and to a lesser extent Treasury bills and corporate bonds. In July
2012, the purchase programme reached GBP 375 billion, or 90% of the BoE’s assets
(Figure 2). Currently, the BoE holds nearly 25% of issued debt.
Figure 1. Composition of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet assets
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Figure 2. Composition of the Bank of England’s balance sheet assets
The Bank of Japan operated in a slightly different fashion, in the context of deflationary
pressures since mid-1990. The policy rate is close to zero since March 1999. In March
2001, the bank initiated a policy of massive purchases of securities (mainly Japanese
government bonds), which led to a very substantial increase in the size of its balance
sheet. Despite the onset of the global financial crisis, the size of the balance sheet
remained almost constant until the end of 2010. During this phase, the short-term
procurement programs (purchase of commercial paper and corporate bonds) have been
launched; the Bank of Japan has also engaged in temporary purchases of Japanese
government bonds. In October 2010, with the Asset Purchase Program (APP) the Bank of
Japan started to purchase Japanese government bonds as well as corporate bonds,
commercial paper and fund units invested in residential real estate. It also included a
package of guarantees against loans to commercial banks for maturities up to 6 months (3
months against previous loans from the Bank of Japan). APP was interrupted in March
2013. At that time the outstanding APP value was worth 72 trillion yen (for a target of 80
trillion yen in late 2013). As part of Abenomics, Japan's central bank launched in April 2013
a new program, extremely proactive, the Quantitative and Qualitative monetary easing
(QQE) programme (Figure 3). This programme aims to achieve an inflation rate of 2% at a
two-year horizon. It consists in doubling in two years the monetary base in Japan through
the doubling of the securities portfolio of the Bank of Japan (Japanese government
securities mainly). As for the qualitative aspect of the program, the Bank of Japan is
seeking to double, also on a two-year horizon, the average maturity of its portfolio of
government securities. The monetary base in Japan has increased from 138 trillion yen to
202 trillion yen, between late 2012 and late 2013. According to projections by the Bank of
Japan, it is expected to reach 270 trillion yen by the end of 2014.
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Figure 3. Composition of the BoJ’s balance sheet assets
3.2. Policy effectiveness
A large body of literature exists about the effects of unconventional monetary policy
measures, which largely focusses on financial market reaction. The overall conclusion that
can be drawn from these studies is that unconventional measures have usually had a
significant impact on sovereign and private yields (portfolio balance effects), though this
impact has been relatively short-lived. Impacts on inflation and real GDP have been less
common, and of an insufficient size to compensate for the real costs of the global financial
crisis.
It must be acknowledged that empirical research on this topic is not an easy task because
it is difficult to disentangle the contribution of unconventional monetary measures from
other simultaneous policies or shocks.
Hereafter, we classify the different studies according to the transmission mechanisms of
unconventional monetary measures that they investigate.
Portfolio balance and signalling effects
For the US, Gagnon et al. (2011) show that Fed’s assets purchases between 2008 and 2010
had several effects on Treasuries and corporate bonds. For example, they reduced 10-year
interest rate from 30 to 100 basis points. Other studies confirm that asset purchase
programmes reduced medium and long-term interest rates (D’Amico and King, 2010, who
differentiate between short run (flow) and long run (stock) effects; Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011, who report an overshooting effect of QE on Treasury bonds yields
in contrast with MBS bonds yields; Altavilla and Giannone, 2014, who find significant effects
on forecasts of bond yields one-year ahead of the announcement and implementation of
accommodative measures). Comparatively, Hamilton and Wu (2012) conclude on rather
small effects whereas Wright (2012) reports very short-lived effects.
Gagnon et al. (2011) also study Japanese and UK large-scale asset purchases. They report
effects in the UK similar to the US, but only small effects in the case of the Japanese QE.
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Oda and Ueda (2007) report a similar low, though significant, impact on Japanese
government bonds yields.
For the UK, Meier (2009), with an event-study, shows that the announcement of the QE
reduced the gilt yields by at least 60 basis points. Joyce et al (2011a) find similar results
and estimate that long-term gilt yields fell by 100 basis points after the first
announcement. They also find similar results on corporate bond yields and small reaction
on the sterling exchange rate. Breedon et al. (2012) highlight a similar portfolio balance
channel, but limited pass-through to corporate bond yields. Joyce and Tong (2012) use
high-frequency data and show that QE measures have had long-lasting effects on gilt
yields.
Macro effects
Given that effects of unconventional monetary policy need time to influence the macro
variables, it is more difficult to point out some results than on the financial markets with an
event-study. Nevertheless, Baumeister and Benati (2010) estimate that unconventional
measures diminish both deflation risks and output recession in the US and in the UK.
Kapetanios et al. (2012) emphasize that in the UK, QE, in reducing medium-to-long-term
gilt yields, had a positive effect both on real GDP (around 1.5%) and on annual CPI
inflation (around 1.25 percentage points). Bridges and Thomas (2012) reach similar
results. Joyce at al. (2011b) compare their SVAR approach with the two former papers and
also find similar effects.
Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013) provide estimates of the Japanese QE at the zero-lower
bound. They conclude that policy measures had a transitory effect on long-term interest
rates, output and inflation and that QE was not successful at combating deflationary trends.
Bank lending channel
Bowman et al. (2011) report a bank lending boost after the Japanese QE of 2001, although
the boost is found to be small.
Butt et al. (2014) test whether BoE’s QE provided a boost to bank lending in the United
Kingdom. They identify the effects of variation in deposits on individual banks’ balance
sheets and test whether this variation in deposits boosted lending. They find no evidence to
suggest that QE operated via a traditional bank lending channel in the spirit of the model
due to Kashyap and Stein. They suggest that QE operating through a portfolio rebalancing
channel gave rise to flighty deposits and that this is a potential reason why they find no
evidence of a bank lending channel.
Exchange rate channel
Neely (2015) finds that the US QE announcements of 2008-2009 weakened the spot price
of the US dollar, and that these jump depreciations of the USD are fairly consistent with
estimates of the impacts of previous equivalent monetary policy shocks. QE also had spill
over effects via the reduction of international long-term bond yields. Fratzscher at al.
(2013) also deal with the international spill over effects of US monetary policy. They assess
the impact of US QE1 and QE2 on several financial variables to gauge whether the US
unconventional measures have triggered capital inflows in emerging markets and other
industrial countries. It should also be noticed that their empirical strategy allow them to
assess the signalling as well as the portfolio channels. Three conclusions emerge. First, QE
measures have had more effects when they were actually implemented than when they
were announced, meaning that communication (and henceforth signalling channel) matters
but implementation is crucial to trigger the portfolio rebalancing. QE1 and QE2 did not have
the same impact on dollar exchange rate. Actually, QE1 triggered a global rebalancing
Policy Department A: Economic and Scientific Policy
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effect in favour of US equity and bond funds. Thus, the dollar appreciated against other
currencies. The aim of the measures was indeed to provide short-term funds in dollars to
address liquidity needs of international banks, which were short in dollars. Conversely, QE2
have triggered outflows and a dollar depreciation. Clearly, in the case of QE2, the Fed’s
purchases pushed investors to substitute Treasuries for more risky assets. This has
triggered a portfolio rebalancing effect in favour of foreign assets.
The QE experience: worth a try?
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4. QE AT THE ECB
There are important differences in the nature of the measures favoured by the Bank of
Japan, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England, and the ECB. These differences result
in large part from the financial structure of the economies in question. The ECB has for
instance focused on supporting the banking system because of its major role in financing
non-financial agents. In the United States, where market financing is predominant, the
Federal Reserve has instead sought to influence market prices through the purchase of
securities. It must also be stressed that the Euro area faced a specific situation with the
outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. It has led to a sharp rise in long term
sovereign yield for the peripheral countries and thus impaired the transmission of monetary
policy.
4.1. The early unconventional measures
For most of its efforts the ECB has relied on collateralized loans (i.e. against guarantees) to
the banking sector. Since October 2008, auctions for monetary policy transactions have
been conducted at fixed rates with full allotment (FRFA) to meet bank refinancing demands.
In other words, as long as sufficient collateral is provided, all demand for bank liquidity is
met. This policy is thus entirely dependent on the demand for liquidity coming from
commercial banks, and thereby ruptures with the previous policy of a limited supply of
liquidity to banks. Though new, this policy is not unconventional, insofar as it does not
increase the size of the commercial banks’ excess reserves, or the risk borne by the ECB.
Beyond this FRFA policy, the ECB implemented unconventional measures when it decided to
increase the maximum maturity of its loans (initially 3 months), with one-year liquidity
operations carried out in June, September and December 2009 (LTRO) and three-year
liquidity operations in December 2011 and February 2012 (VLTRO). Considering these
measures, the bulk of the increase in the size of the ECB’s balance sheet has been
endogenous and did not reflect “active” policy.
The ECB has also created programmes to purchase securities: (i) secured bank bond
purchases (called “covered bond purchase programmes”, CBPP) in June 2009 and CBPP2 in
November 2011 were designed as a further way of dealing with banks’ financing costs,
which were considered too high and thus incompatible with the orientation of monetary
policy; (ii) the Securities Markets Programme (SMP) was launched in May 2010 to engage
in limited buying of government debt on secondary markets, amounts that were supposedly
sterilized by the ECB; the SMP was designed as a response to the pressure on sovereign
debt markets, which called into question the smooth transmission of monetary policy in the
Euro area; it may not be qualified as QE per se despite assets purchases, notably because
the operations have been sterilized and did not entail a rise in the ECB’s balance sheet (iii)
Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), a new conditional programme of buying sovereign
bonds, announced in September 2012, which is intended to limit what are considered
excessive risk premiums on sovereign debt bonds; (iv) finally, faced with the growing risk
of deflation in the Euro area, the ECB decided on 4 September 2014 to implement a new
programme to purchase the debt securities of European companies and residential real
estate loans (Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme, ABSPP) and a new programme
for purchasing secured bank bonds (CBPP3), with the aim of freeing commercial bank
balance sheets of these debts and thereby encouraging them to lend to companies, in
particular SMEs.
The multiplicity of the ECB's purchasing interventions at this stage could not hide the fact
that programmes remained limited in scale: 100 billion euros were announced by the ECB
for the CBPP and CBPP2 but effective purchases did not exceed 70 billion euros, 162,5
billion euros for the SMP (as stated in the initial announcement), an unlimited but unused
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amount for OMTs and unspecified amounts for ABSPP and CBPP3, compared with about 1
trillion euros for the two long-term lending operations (LTRO), which contributed to
increasing the size of the ECB’s balance sheet (Figure 4). It follows that the ECB has done
more to relieve the commercial banks than to directly support or revive financial market
activities. Another point worth mentioning about unconventional measures implemented by
the ECB is their timing. Indeed, the size of the ECB balance sheet has been substantially
reduced since 2013, in sharp contrast with other major central banks.
The differences in technique between the central bank interventions reflect particular legal
and economic factors—legal, because EU treaties prohibit the ECB from buying sovereign
bonds on the primary market, and economic, as central banks seek to affect financing
conditions as efficiently as possible. In the Euro area, banks provide the bulk of financing
for private sector activity, which is why the ECB intervenes mainly by lending to the
banking sector addressing liquidity needs and substituting for the interbank market.
Conversely, finance for the US economy is more disintermediated, which explains the scale
of the Fed’s securities purchases.
Figure 4. Composition of the ECB’s balance sheet assets
4.2. Effectiveness of ECB’s unconventional measures decided before
2015
The most unconventional measures undertaken by the ECB in 2014 followed three different
objectives in a deteriorating monetary environment: making monetary policy more
accommodative, enhancing monetary policy transmission channels and reflating the
economy. More precisely:
1. There had been an endogenous tightening of the monetary policy stance (through the
reduction of liquidity needs from the banking system), inducing as a reaction:
i. Injections of liquidity (end of SMP sterilization, LTRO, FRFA extension)
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2. There had been a deterioration in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy (“via
the channel of bank credit”), inducing as a reaction:
i. Targeted LTROs
ii. Purchases of ABS and CBPP3
3. There had been an increasing gap between inflation and the ECB target and the medium-
term economic outlook, inducing as a reaction:
i. Broad-based asset purchases (this is discussed in the next two subsections)
We describe hereafter their likely impact, before reviewing the existing empirical literature
about earlier policies.
Injections of liquidity
The impact of the end of the SMP sterilization operation (which increases the reserves of
the central bank) will increase liquidity and thus could push the EONIA rate towards the
bottom of the interest rate corridor. But the effect is likely to be limited, because the
excess liquidity will decline if the banks continue to repay the 450 billion euros from the
existing very long-term refinancing operations (VLTROs). As banks already have access to
virtually unlimited ECB financing and reimbursement, it is not very likely that new liquidity
injections will have a significant impact on the economy, in the context of the current
corridor.
Targeted LTROs
The TLTROs could have a potentially significant effect. The TLTROs are supposed to reduce
banks’ financing costs significantly. Indeed, on average, 4-year financing on the markets
currently costs Euro area banks around 150 basis points. It can be expected that the
TLTROs will reduce this cost. However, even if the banks use the TLTRO programme, it may
not have the desired effect on the monetary policy transmission mechanism, as the banks
may use the money to buy government bonds or other assets rather than increasing the
supply of loans to households and companies. The fact that banks in the Euro area are
currently reimbursing the 2011 and 2012 VLTROs suggests that there are barriers to
lending today (mainly weak demand for loans), even though financing costs are low.
However the main difference between the VLTRO and TLTRO involves conditioning the
provision of liquidity in the latter on an amount of outstanding loans to the non-financial
private sector (excluding mortgages), based on what the Bank of England did with its
Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS) set up in summer 2012. Monetary policy transmission
may thus improve. The first stage of TLTRO has been disappointing as demand for liquidity
provided by the ECB, through this new operation, was relatively weak regarding what was
expected by the ECB. The first allotment amounted to 82.6 billion euros in September 2014
against anticipations between 130 and 150 billion. In December, the allotment had
increased to 130 billion but was still below the figures expected. Several arguments may
explain why demand did not meet expectations. The first is that the banks already have
very broad and very advantageous access to ECB liquidity through the monetary policy
operations implemented by the ECB. Certainly the second and most important reason is
that the weakness of credit in the Euro area is not simply the result of supply factors but
also of demand factors. Sluggish activity and private agents’ efforts to shed debt are
restraining lending. It is also possible that banks are trying to reduce their exposure to risk.
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ABS purchases and CBPP3
The new measures undertaken before 2015 supplement the TLTRO programme, as these
purchases should allow substitution in the banks’ balance sheets in favour of lending to the
real economy. However, it is impossible at this stage to quantify the impact of these
announcements. The purchases of covered bonds began in October 2014, while the ABS
purchases will begin before the end of the year. The covered bond spreads have narrowed
in response to these announcements. The purchases will continue for at least two years,
but no details on their amount have been given.
Estimates of the current size of the ABS market vary, but are around the 1,000 billion euro
mark, about half of which is traded on the financial markets. The quality of outstanding
ABS securities varies, and not all will be eligible for ECB purchases. In addition, a large part
of the existing shares are already used as collateral with the ECB.
More specifically, Mario Draghi announced on 4 September 2014 that the objective could be
to raise the ECB’s balance sheet to its level of early 2012. To do this would require
increasing it from its current level by 1,000 billion euros. It seems doubtful that the
combination of TLTRO programmes and purchases of ABS and covered bonds would enable
the ECB to achieve half or more of the 1,000 billion euros of net expansion in the size of its
balance sheet. This may then explain why the ECB has considered further measures in
December and announced an extended QE (see below). The first tranche of the TLTRO
programme has been disappointing (the ECB allotted 82.6 billion euros on 18 September
2014, and 129 billion euros on 11 December for the second tranche, the total being even
smaller than the 2014 LTRO early repayments). The continuing deterioration of the
macroeconomic environment will give motivation to the investors  to hold their assets until
the ECB’s policy goes even further. To achieve a one trillion euro expansion of its balance
sheet, the ECB needs to move to the next step of the plan set out by Mario Draghi in the
Spring, i.e. “Broad-based asset purchases” (BBAP), and in order to reach the agreed target,
the purchase of euro-area sovereign bonds will be included.
A few papers in the literature have so far been devoted to investigating the effectiveness of
these early unconventional measures implemented by the ECB.
The portfolio balance and signalling effects
Peersman (2011) showed that increasing the size of the ECB balance sheet had persistent
effects on interest rate spreads charged by banks, inducing an effect on liquidity.
Pattipeiholy et al. (2013) conclude that LTRO and SMP measures had the expected effects
on government-bond yields, but only in the short term or the very short term regarding the
latest. The SMP measures are reported to have had an effect “within a few weeks”, in Italy
and Spain. Altavilla et al. (2014) study the implications of OMT announcements and find a
rather strong effect on Italian and Spanish government bond yields (about 2 percentage
points). They also show that these measures had no effect on Germany and France: OMT
announcements had the expected effects of alleviating the burden of “crisis large countries”
of the Euro area periphery. Szczerbowicz (2012) reaches a similar conclusion: central bank
interventions in sovereign market are more effective in peripheral countries with relatively
high risk premium. She also reports that SMP measures and OMT announcements lowered
long-term borrowing costs for banks, with the largest impact in the peripheral countries.
The risk channel
Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) report quite substantial impacts of SMP and OMT on
government bond yields, whereas the LTRO would only have had small effects. They go
beyond the portfolio balance effect and investigate the risk channel. Their contribution is to
shed light on the decomposition of the policy-induced yields change. They look for three
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main components: change in the probability of default; currency redenomination risk (e.g.
exiting the Euro area); and segmentation risk (e.g. bonds falling below the minimum rating
to be accepted as collateral by the ECB). They show that in Italy and Spain, default and
segmentation risks played a crucial role in the impact of SMP and OMT. In Portugal and
Spain, the redenomination risk also played a role. Finally, and contrary to some beliefs that
ECB unconventional measures can be regarded as transfers from the Euro area core to the
periphery, Krishnamurthy et al. (2014) report positive spill over effects via increasing stock
returns in the core countries.
Macro effects
Giannone et al. (2012) construct a measure of non-standard monetary policy that
highlights the increasing role of the ECB as a financial intermediary. Then they report
“small but significant” effects of this ECB policy on loans and economic activity. Bank loans
to households and non-financial corporations are found higher than without non-standard
monetary policy, while industrial production would have been 2 percentage points higher
and the unemployment rate 0.6 percentage points lower.
Gambacorta et al. (2014) find that increasing central banks’ balance sheets led to
temporary increases in economic activity, but also to increases, though weaker and less
persistent, in prices. Though ECB measures have been different from other central banks,
like the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve, they reach similar
conclusions whatever the country they study.
4.3. The unfolding QE
The latest three waves of unconventional operations implemented by the ECB since June
2014 have focused more directly on the acquisition of corporate securities, which means
bypassing the banking sector (while euro area sovereign bond are mainly held by the
banking sector). This workaround should hopefully strengthen the transmission of
monetary policy to the real economy, raise the size of the balance sheet and help avoid the
risk of deflation in the Euro area. During the third wave of unconventional operations, a
large-scale QE has finally been announced.
Two monetary policy decisions were announced by the ECB on 22 January 2015: (i) an
expansion of its asset purchase programme to include sovereign, supranational and agency
bonds; and (ii) a change in the pricing of the six remaining targeted longer-term
refinancing operations (TLTROs), removing the 10bp spread over the main refinancing rate.
The programme of asset purchases has, as expected, been expanded to include sovereign,
agency and €A-wide supranational bonds, to complement the existing programmes for
asset-backed securities and covered bonds. It may then be compared in size with the QE3
implemented by the Federal Reserve from September 2012. Purchases of these new asset
classes will be €60bn per month and will begin in March 2015, and are open-ended and
linked to the ECB’s inflation objective, although they will last at least until September 2016
(“will in any case be conducted until we see a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation
which is consistent with our aim of achieving inflation rates below, but close to, 2% over
the medium term”). Securities purchased under the extended programme will have a
maturity between 2 and 30 years. Mario Draghi confirmed that securities with negative
yields would be eligible for purchase. There will be some risk-sharing: 80% of the
additional sovereign purchases will be made by national central banks and only 20% of the
additional purchases would be subject to risk-sharing. This programme thus departs from
the default mode of full risk-sharing. In that sense, it is unlike the OMT, where risk-sharing
was central. Holdings of government, agencies’ and international institutions’ securities will
be valued at amortised cost, preventing losses resulting from market valuation changes.
The purchases of sovereign and agency bonds will be scaled to each NCB’s share in the
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ECB’s capital. There are a number of conditions. For Greece, purchases can be made as
long as the waiver remains in place, that it remains in a financial assistance programme,
and that there is no breach of an issuer limit. More generally, purchases of the bonds of
countries subject to a financial assistance program will be paused when that program is
under review.
To get agreement on the programme, the ECB had to include some constraints on its
purchases, including the constraint not to buy more than 25% of a given bond issue so as
to avoid having a blocking minority in collective action clauses. The ECB will not buy more
than 25% of each country’s eligible debt stock. For the smallest Euro area countries, this
constraint will bind in a matter of months as they do not have large stocks of long-term
debt. The ECB is also likely to hit its purchase limits for German debt around September
2016. The duration of the ECB’s programme seems to have been calibrated based on these
constraints. To extend QE beyond 2016 would either require relaxing the 25% purchase
limit, allowing purchases to be directed to countries with the largest debt stocks, or buying
other assets (e.g. corporate debt).
4.4. A preliminary assessment of the expected effects of ECB most
recent QE
One of the main channels of ECB QE might be the signalling and portfolio rebalancing
effects. With monetary policy diverging, higher US and UK yields may provide an incentive
- following sales of Euro area and Japanese debt - to switch to UK and US bonds. In
previous QE episodes in the UK and US, the four economies considered here were going in
the same direction so emerging economies received the majority of carry-trade flows.
Moreover, the ECB’s QE purchases are large enough to exceed net debt issuance by the
related countries. This is unusual compared with other QE episodes and implies that private
investors will have to actively sell Euro area debt in order for the ECB to meet its purchase
targets. The ECB will buy €800bn of sovereign debt over 2015-16, versus net issuance of
around €350bn. It means that the private sector must sell €450bn. Within the Euro area,
banks remain the largest domestic holders. If they reduce their holdings, they are most
likely to switch into other zero-risk weighted assets in order to maintain capital ratios and
so purchases of other AAA/AA rated sovereign debt are most obvious.
The exchange rate channel might be more powerful as monetary policy stances between
large advanced economies are diverging. In the US and UK, the likely and expected future
policy decisions are tightening. The continuous depreciation of the Euro over the last year
could therefore continue and support Euro area exports. It might here be noticed that the
depreciation started before the announcement of the QE, has been reinforced after and
continued with the first round of asset purchases (Figure 5). It may indicate that these
measures have been partly anticipated by financial markets. The ECB had indeed largely
communicated during the second semester of 2014 that it stood ready to implement
additional measures if it was judged necessary. The ECB has notably scrutinized the
developments of inflation rate and inflation expectations. The fact that expectations have
moved away from the 2% target (Figure 6) has certainly influenced and urged ECB
decisions in order to keep prices anchored to the target.
Last, the size of the ECB’s QE program may also generate confidence among market
participants, firms and households that the ECB will step in as much as necessary to
preserve the unity of the European monetary union and sustain its economic conditions.
Higher confidence among private agents may in turn drive higher consumption and
investment.
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Figure 5. Euro daily exchange rates
Source: Datastream
Figure 6. Inflation quarterly expectations
Source: ECB (Survey of Professional Forecasters)
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5. KEY MESSAGES FROM FOREIGN QE EXPERIENCES
Drawing on BoE, BoJ, and Fed QE experiments, the first key message that shall be
addressed to the ECB is that QE’s main transmission channel has been the portfolio-balance
one. However, this effect may not prove very fruitful in the Euro area. First, some
countries, like Germany, already have historically low interest rates. A kind of zero lower
bound on government bond yields may arise and limit the effectiveness of QE. Second, as
stated in the previous section, the requirement by commercial banks to maintain their
capital ratios may also produce lower interest rates, not in Euro area countries, but outside
of the Euro area, e.g. in the US and the UK where demand for bonds may increase after
European banks may have sold parts of their European government bonds holdings to the
ECB. Consequently, interest rates would not necessarily decrease in the Euro area, as
would be expected, but the Euro would depreciate.
Hence, the second key message is that the exchange rate channel will be crucial in the
European context, and might even be reinforced by the portfolio rebalancing channel. A
depreciating Euro vis-à-vis e.g. the US dollar may generate some inflation in the Euro area.
Foreign experiments have not shown strong exchange rate channels, but this situation can
be explained by a (relative) monetary synchronisation among the major central banks. In
the current context of the European QE, with monetary de-synchronisation, the exchange
rate channel may be expected to substitute for the less successful portfolio balance effect.
Consequently, it may be recommended that the ECB does not prevent the Euro
depreciation, though it may lead to higher exchange rate volatility. As a matter of fact,
monetary policy de-synchronisation between the Euro area and the US may produce some
overshooting à la Dornbusch, i.e. a sharp Euro depreciation in the short-run, followed by an
appreciation towards the long-run exchange rate. Not preventing the Euro depreciation
certainly requires communication by the ECB on the persistence of a low MRO interest rate
(“forward guidance”), acknowledging the reliance of QE on the exchange rate channel.
The third key message relates to the context in which QE measures have been
implemented. In the US and UK, QE measures started when inflation, not deflation, was
present in the economy. In Japan, QE measures occurred against the backdrop of deflation.
In the literature, QE has usually been found to be more effective in the US and the UK than
in Japan. One important reason behind this assessment is the impact of deflation on debt.
Under deflation like in Japan, the potential growing size of real debts burdens the policy
mix as it fosters the government to resume fiscal consolidation. In the European context, it
is certainly crucial that QE does not see its potential effects limited by a new wave of
austerity because prices, currently going down, weigh on real debts.
On the contrary, in order to escape the deflation Japanese trap, more than an
accommodative monetary policy is required, whatever the size of the accommodation. An
expansionary policy mix is required. A key message for the Euro area from QE foreign
experiments is indeed to endeavour to improve policy coordination between Euro area
governments and the ECB. When inflation is positive, QE is able to alleviate the real costs
of fiscal consolidation, via lower government and corporate bond yields. It has happened in
the US. When deflation occurs and under the zero lower bound, QE cannot alleviate these
costs. Hence, the success of ECB QE at driving up inflation and inflation expectations
requires government interventions. An actual flexibility in the management of public
deficits, with margins for manoeuvre to limit fiscal consolidation or to implement a fiscal
expansion in some countries, may help the ECB to fulfil its mandate. It may be stressed
that fiscal multipliers can be larger due to the expansionary monetary policy. It may then
call for a stronger coordination between fiscal and monetary tools. To this end, the ECB
might reinforce the impact of investment plans in the Euro area and notably the Juncker’s
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Plan by making securities issued to finance investments (public or private) eligible to the
assets purchase programme.
Finally, Bech et al. (2012) have suggested that monetary policy effectiveness might be
reduced when private agents are deleveraging. This was also emphasized during the
Japanese crisis, with the problem of a fragile banking system. It is then of crucial
importance to address this issue and to this end, the new role of the ECB, as financial
supervisor, is important. The undercapitalization of the banking system, or at least of some
institutions, should be addressed so that cooperation at all levels of economic policy
implementation (government, central bank and financial supervisor) facilitates the success
of monetary policy and the new QE.
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